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Abstract 
 
Studies concerned with regulation and governance have recently crossed paths with the literature 
on policy instruments. One insight from the combination of these two strands is that policy 
instruments contain cognitive and normative beliefs about policy. Thus their usage stacks the deck in 
favour of one type of actor or one type of regulatory solution. In this article, we challenge the 
assumption that there is a pre-determined relationship between ideas, regulatory policy instruments 
and outcomes. We argue that different combinations of conditions lead to different outcomes, 
depending on how actors use the instrument. Empirically, we analyze 31 EU and UK case studies of 
regulatory impact assessment (RIA) – a regulatory policy instrument that has been pivotal in the so-
called better regulation movement. We distinguish four main usages of RIA, that is, political, 
instrumental, communicative and perfunctory. We find that instrumental usage is not so rare 
and that the contrast between communicative and political usages is less stark than it is 
commonly thought. This variability of RIA usages could be reduced if governments were 
clearer on expectations. In terms of policy recommendations, the QCA analysis shows that 
there are different paths to desirable outcomes. Governments, international organizations 
and audit bodies should therefore explore different combinations of conditions leading to 
the usages they deem desirable rather than arguing for a fixed menu of variables. 
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THE MANY USES OF REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENTS: A META-
ANALYSIS OF EU AND UK CASES 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Contemporary capitalism is an era of policy flux where regulatory, deregulatory, and 
re-regulatory shifts are occurring simultaneously. New regulatory domains have emerged, 
such as risk, the regulation of private security companies, financial (re)-regulation, and 
corporate governance, as well as ambitious attempts to forge international regulatory 
cooperation in areas such as climate change and intellectual property rights. Deregulation 
was widely adopted with the aims of increasing foreign direct investment and reducing 
regulatory burdens on growth. Yet deregulatory failures have triggered a re-calibration of 
policy strategies. The emphasis has shifted from deregulation to regulatory quality - the 
question is not the total level of regulation, but the efficiency, accountability, consistency 
and transparency of regulation. In turn, research on regulatory quality has shown that it 
cannot be achieved by simply clamping down on the total number of rules. It requires a 
proper institutional design of regulatory oversight institutions. 
In response, European governments have experimented for almost a decade with 
regulatory reform agendas often dubbed 'better regulation policies' or 'smart regulation' 
(Commission, 2010; OECD, 2002; Wiener, 2006). These agendas include simplification, 
reduction of administrative burdens, consultation, access to regulatory policy formulation, 
notice and comment procedures, and regulatory impact assessment (RIA – often called 
impact assessment, IA, in Europe). Within this reform agenda, RIA is a key policy instrument 
(OECD, 2009; readers of this journal may refer to Cecot et al, 2008 and Peci and Sobral, 2011 
for the characteristics of RIA), although recently other instruments such as tools for the 
elimination of administrative burdens have become prominent (Wegrich, 2009). Existing 
empirical research demonstrates the malleability of RIAs: the appraisal process is molded 
and shaped by policy actors to serve a variety of different purposes (Cecot et al, 2008; 
Radaelli, 2010a, 2010b; Renda 2006; Turnpenny et al, 2009; for specific sectors see Torriti, 
2010). This article builds on these findings by addressing two specific questions. How is RIA 
shaped during the process of its implementation? What are the combinations of conditions 
that lead to different usages? 
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We introduce the concepts and the analytical framework in Section 2. There are 
several theoretical angles that are commonly used to analyze RIA – including institutional 
analysis, diffusion, knowledge utilization, and economic theory. In this article, we draw on 
the literature of policy instruments and focus on the implementation stage, looking at how 
constellations of actors shape the usages of RIA. Section 3 presents the research questions, 
expectations, data and methods. Specifically, we identify four types of usages of RIA – 
political, instrumental, communicative, and perfunctory and present 31 case studies of RIA 
for meta-analysis and explain sample selection and measurement. Qualitative comparative 
analysis (QCA) is used to explore the different combinations of conditions that lead to 
different usages of RIAs. Our use of QCA has a deductive element to it: the choice of 
conditions or variables is theoretically informed. However our interest is not in testing 
individual theories. Since QCA allows researchers to explore a limited number of cases in a 
configurational way, where the research engages in a ‘dialogue between cases and relevant 
theories’ (Rihoux and Ragin, 2009: 6), we are interested in examining how combinations of 
elements of the appraisal process inform RIA usage. Section 4 presents the univariate 
examination of the 31 cases, whilst in Section 5 we move to QCA to explore the different 
configurational paths that can lead to different types of RIA. Section 6 briefly concludes and 
reflects on the conceptual, methodological and normative implications of the findings. 
 
2. Concepts and Framework 
 
The standard mode of analysis of RIA focuses on how 'good' the assessment is, using 
objective and subjective indicators to check whether the RIAs carried out by a given 
department or a government stand up to either formal guidance documents or more 
theoretical benchmarks, often drawn from applied cost-benefit analysis (Cecot et al, 2008; 
Hahn and Litan, 2005; Renda, 2006). Recently, however, political scientists have introduced 
different, theory-based perspectives that seek to explain how RIAs actually work (Turnpenny 
et al, 2009 provide a systematic overview of existing studies), such as diffusion theory (De 
Francesco, 2011), knowledge utilization (Schrefler, 2010), the political control of 
bureaucracies (Radaelli, 2010a), institutional analysis (Sager and Rissi, 2009), new 
institutional economics (Dunlop, 2010) and decision theory (Nilsson et al, 2008). 
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In this article, we also seek to explore how RIAs work but, theoretically, we are 
concerned with the relationship between ideas and policy instruments (Béland, 2010; Braun 
and Busch, 1999; Kassim and Le Galès, 2010; Schneider and Ingram, 1993; Salamon, 2002). 
Policy instruments – and policy appraisal tools are no exception – can be analyzed by 
looking at their design, their performance, their usage and the 'theories' implicit in their 
adoption (Hood and Margetts, 2006; Lascoumes and Le Galès, 2007; Salamon, 2002; on 
implications for policy appraisal tools see Turnpenny et al, 2009). Instruments are carriers of 
ideas, theories, and worldviews – such as the belief that monetization is a convenient way 
to measure the value of the environment and life (Kysar, 2010). The key proposition, 
therefore, is that instruments embody normative and cognitive ideas about public policy. By 
carrying ideas, often implicitly, instruments bias the policy process. They tilt the scale or 
stack the deck in favor of certain actors and bring the ideational components of public policy 
to bear on policy outcomes. This chimes with the findings of authors inspired by delegation 
theories. They explain administrative requirements, such as evidentiary standards and 
public disclosure obligations (of which RIA is an obvious incarnation), in terms of how they 
reduce asymmetry information and ultimately favor the principal (McCubbins, Noll and 
Weingast, 1987). The policy instrument – so the argument goes – carries a precise set of 
ideas about how policy ought to be. We can therefore predict that its usage will lead to 
certain outcomes in terms of power and policy.  
There is a problem with this set of propositions, however. When we move from the 
adoption to implementation of RIA, and examine the usages of RIA, we typically find that 
the ideas, beliefs, and theories embodied in policy instruments are ambiguous and 
malleable. In consequence, we have to draw on implementation analysis (for a review see 
O'Toole, 2000), acknowledge ideational ambiguity up front, and examine the many usages 
of policy instruments. This is indispensable if we are make theoretical progress on how 
instruments for policy appraisal are used on the ground. One important strand of 
implementation analysis has indeed argued that constellations of actors engage in evolution 
rather than execution of policy (Majone and Wildavsky, 1978), bring communicative 
interaction to bear on their interactions (Grin and van de Graaf, 1996) and re-convene to 
frame the policy issues (Rein, 2006). Perhaps they even erode, cheat, and ultimately re-
shape regulatory space (Richardson, 1996; Thatcher and Coen, 2008). Transaction-cost 
theories of politics come to the same conclusion: actors' constellations adapt incomplete 
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contracts when implementing them. Such adaptation leads authors such as Avinash Dixit to 
treat "policymaking as a process that goes on in 'real time' and constantly combines some 
features of rulemaking and some of individual acts" (Dixit, 1996:29). 
Consequently, we relax the chain-of-command assumption that an instrument 
carries an unambiguous set of ideas and because of this steers usage in one direction or 
another. Instead, we consider ideational ambiguity at the implementation stage. The 
consequences are clear. Under conditions of ideational ambiguity, policy instruments are 
shaped by the constellations of actors that use them. Specifically, we identify conditions for 
different types of contingent framing in RIA use. We also explore the consequences of 
ideational ambiguity for policy instrumentation. Thus, we contribute to the ideational strand 
on ambiguity and strategic manipulation of ideas and knowledge (Daviter, 2007; Jabko, 
2006; Rein, 2006; Schrefler, 2010; Zahariadis, 2008).  
Finally, we take issue with the normative approach suggested by international 
organizations, audit institutions and think thanks (OECD, 2008; NAO, Various Years; Renda, 
2006). This approach recommends a single recipe for a successful implementation of RIA, 
revolving around ‘strong’ central units, appraisal processes that start ‘early’ enough to carry 
out economic analysis, intense consultation with the stakeholders, and a separation of the 
‘technical’ from the ‘political’. We do not say that all this is necessarily wrong. Rather, we 
stress equifinality: there may be different combinations of the key elements of the appraisal 
process that lead to the same usage of RIA. This ties in with our methodological choice for 
qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) as we shall see in a moment. 
 
3. Research Questions, Methods and Data 
 
Having entered our framework based on policy instruments and implementation, we turn to 
our prior expectations and the research questions, before we move to methods and data. 
Our framework lends itself quite naturally to two main research questions. R1 How is RIA 
shaped and used at the stage of implementation? R2 What are the combinations of 
conditions that lead to one type of usage instead of another? Finally, it is legitimate to 
consider the question 'why would all this matter?' We then enter the third research 
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question R3: what are the wider implications of our analysis in terms of the interplay of 
(ambiguous) ideas, framing, and shapings? 
 To address these questions, we need to develop ex-ante expectations about a finite 
number of ways in which RIA can be shaped at the stage of implementation. Unfortunately, 
there is no systematic literature that predicts how RIA will be molded by policy actors. 
However, two recent studies provide insights on this aspect. In his comparative analysis of 
European and North-American countries, Radaelli (2010b) argues that institutional variables 
(such as the position and role of the executive and presence of a minister who can call the 
shots for change, but also softer institutional variables such as 'market for ideas and advice' 
in government) predict whether a country will steer RIA towards one of the following 
usages: control of the bureaucracy, instrumental learning, administrative reform, and 
perfunctory usages. This is a macro-approach that gives us an idea of how RIA may be 
shaped and reframed, but it does not really explain the level of implementation and why, 
even within the same country, some RIAs are less perfunctory in one sector than in another. 
Meuwese (2008), instead, works on four case studies of RIA in the European Union (EU) – 
thus, one jurisdiction, but with four cases. This is a more convenient approach to examine 
implementation. She finds five distinct meanings or ways of 'framing' appraisal in the EU: (a) 
to speak the truth to power; (b) to use RIA to highlight trade-offs in lawmaking; (c) to 
provide a forum for the input of a wide range of stakeholders; (d) to give reasons for 
legislative decisions (a notion close to the US Administrative Procedure Act requirement); 
and (e) to structure stakeholder deliberation and discourse. 
We cannot import wholesale Meuwese's categorization – and even less so Radaelli's. 
Meuwese's is designed to capture the nature of organizational relations within the 
Commission, on the one hand, and between the Commission, the European Parliament and 
the Council, on the other. It does not tell us when to expect one type of RIA or another. 
Radaelli's categories lead to the expectation that there is a median RIA with certain 
characteristics in a given country, hence it not suitable to examine variation within a single 
country. However, both studies shed light on a finite number of possible adaptations of RIA. 
We can therefore combine the insights of these two studies and relate them to 
broader theoretical issues introduced in Section 2. The result is four possible ways of 
framing and shaping RIAs: 
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(i) Political Usage. Both delegation theorists (McCubbins et al, 1987) and RIA specialists 
(Radaelli, 2010a) argue that RIA is shaped by the principal to control the agent. 
However, this is too narrow a conception of political for our purposes. Since our 
evidence is European (specifically UK and EU, see below) we need to broaden out 
this concept. First, political usages should also capture the desire of the Member 
States to tame the regulatory activity of the European Commission typically 
exercised via a regulatory oversight body. Hence ‘political control of the 
bureaucracy’ can be extended to the EU, where there is no unitary executive. 
Second, political usages cover instances in which the process of appraisal is not 
based on the ideals of evidence-based policymaking, but is used by affected social, 
economic and political interests to provoke or handle conflict, for example with 
social partners or the opposition in parliament. We should therefore expect 
attempts to de-legitimize the process or to bring explicit political conflict within the 
economic analysis of proposed regulation. Our interest here is in the political usage 
of RIA rather than the nature of the outcomes of this usage. 
(ii) Instrumental Usage. The appraisal process can be used to enhance substantive 
understandings of the cause and effect mechanisms that underpin the policy issue. 
This second type of usage arises out of the long-search for rationality in the policy 
sciences (Carley, 1981; Moran, 2003). Recently, the movement for evidence-based 
policy has swept across Europe, and studies of RIA have highlighted the increased 
importance of analyzing and cataloguing the costs and benefits of regulatory 
proposals where truth speaks to power (Meuwese, 2008). 
(iii) Communicative Usage. Best practice prescriptions of RIA usage stipulate that RIA be 
published as part of the formal consultation process to provide consultees with 
information on the impact of the policy proposal (OECD 2009). Thus in a way all RIAs 
should have a communicative element. However, we were looking for the use of RIA 
to shape interactions with stakeholders in a manner beyond formal consultation. 
Here RIA becomes a venue where policy actors communicate and conduct regulatory 
conversations – essentially we combine Meuwese's intuitions of processes of impact 
assessment as forum for dialogic encounters between regulators and stakeholders 
and a mechanism that allows deliberation and structures stakeholder discourse. 
Again, our interest is in the use of RIA as a communicative arena rather than in the 
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outcomes of these dialogues. Organizations such as the European Commission have 
sought to respond to their legitimacy deficit by embracing notions of open 
governance, participation, and even deliberation. The White Paper on Governance of 
2001 is the best example of this aim (Commission, 2001). Interestingly, the 
preparatory works for the White Paper provide evidence of large-scale intellectual 
activity on regulatory oversight and RIA. The 2002 European Commission's better 
regulation agenda bears several traces of these notions of participatory-deliberative 
governance (Allio, 2009). As mentioned, Meuwese found a forum-type of usage in 
her case studies, whilst Radaelli (2010b) does not consider this aspect. Scott (2010) 
argues convincingly that this type has to be considered because of its important 
properties for the reflexivity of law and regulatory conversations (Black, 2002). 
(iv) Perfunctory Usage. Finally, although Meuwese (2008) does not consider this type, 
there is evidence (Radaelli, 2010b) that governments adopt RIA but then 
constellations of actors water-down, 'mute' or simply do not implement the 
instrument. Such behavior can be explained by organizational theory, which points 
towards de-coupling between rationalistic tools and pragmatic policy formulation in 
loosely coupled organizations (Weick, 1976).  
 
Our first expectation is that we will find different types of RIA even within a single 
case; these four common usage types are not mutually exclusive (as illustrated by Radaelli, 
2010b). Current research suggests that instrumental and communicative usages are rare 
(Hertin et al, 2009; Jacob et al, 2008; Nilsson et al, 2008; Turnpenny et al, 2009). In contrast, 
political and / or perfunctory usages of RIA are widespread (Scott, 2010; Hertin et al, 2009; 
Jacob et al, 2008; National Audit Office Various Years, Nilsson et al, 2008; Russel and 
Turnpenny, 2010; Turnpenny et al, 2009; Wiener, 2006). Thus, our second expectation is to 
find a distribution skewed towards political and perfunctory RIAs. 
Another, general, expectation is that the way in which an RIA is shaped depends on 
how actors’ constellations, so to speak, 'sit down' and negotiate ideational ambiguity, 
resources and usages of the instrument they handle. It is difficult to specify conditions ex-
ante but both the evaluations of the United Kingdom's National Audit Office (Various Years), 
the academic literature cited in the previous paragraph suggest the following specific 
expectations: (a) RIAs that explicitly analyze trade-offs and distributive effects increase the 
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probability of political intervention; (b) availability of time, human resources and expertise 
are pre-conditions for bureaucratic learning; and (c) balanced consultation and transparency 
facilitate communicative regulation, but stakeholders that expand conflict within the 
process of appraisal and outside (via direct lobbying and appeals to public opinion) tilt RIA 
towards political usages. Finally, we have to model expectations about the role of the 
central regulatory oversight unit, such as the Better Regulation Executive and the 
Secretariat General of the Commission, is ambiguous. On the one hand, it can provide 
assistance to the officers that work out the RIA in their department, on the other they can 
exercise political control to align the final proposal with the preferences of the principal 
(Radaelli, 2010a).  
To answer our research questions and check on expectations, we employ meta-
analysis of existing RIA case studies, both with univariate and qualitative comparative 
analysis (QCA) techniques. Meta-analysis of case studies is a typical way to extract 
cumulative findings from the ‘goldmine’ of individual cases, as shown by Jensen and 
Rodgers (2001), with different options in terms of how to handle the data. We meta-
analyzed the case studies by scoring them on the basis of a list of variables and then coded 
them in a 0-1 format to make them amenable to QCA. Thus, to conclude that a RIA is of one 
type and / or another, we check for a coherent pattern across the variables identified in the 
case study. We classified the RIA as belonging to more than one category when indicators 
pointed towards different usages. This is a standard procedure when we move from highly 
abstract mode of use to individual cases: each case can contain empirical elements that 
refer to more than one mode of use (see Radaelli, 2010b on the multi-purpose nature of 
RIA). 
 Turning to sample construction, we considered existing case studies of RIA. By 'RIA 
case study' we mean a report on a specific process of appraisal with a narrative/analytical 
structure. We included only case studies based on primary interviews and the analysis of 
available documentation, including published RIAs and relevant material surrounding them. 
For this reason, we did not include the large amount of data made available by scorecards of 
RIAs in Europe (Cecot et al, 2008; Renda, 2006). There is quite a bit of information in these 
scorecards. Yet we cannot simply aggregate scorecard analysis with case studies, since the 
two sources of information differ in a radical way. To be clear, in this study an individual 
‘case’ refers to a single qualitative case study, not an individual RIA. As well as allowing us to 
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analyze and collate detailed qualitative accounts, the meta-analytic approach also reduces 
the distance between our sample size and the universe of cases. While there are around 100 
EU RIAs and 180 UK RIAs conducted each year
1
, there are only 49 case studies. Here, we 
examine 31 of them
2
. 
We found case studies in projects funded by the EU, such as a comprehensive 
evaluation of the Commissions' RIA (TEP, The Evaluation Partnership, 2007), EVIA 
(Evaluating Impact Assessment), and Matisse (Methods and Tools for Integrated 
Sustainability Assessment). Reportedly, the European Court of Auditors carried out cases 
studies in the preparation of their 2010 report (ECA, 2010), but they did not release them 
since they are considered internal preparatory material (correspondence with ECA can be 
sent to the reviewers upon request). 
In this article, we focus on case studies based on the UK and the EU, since these are 
the most developed and most comparable systems of RIA. To the best of our knowledge, 
there are also a few scattered cases on Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, Poland and one 
on Italy, but they refer to systems of impact assessment that vary markedly (e.g., up until 
recently, Denmark and the Netherlands used impact assessment only to measure a special 
category of costs, that is, costs originating from administrative obligations). Only in the UK 
and the EU is the scope of RIA broad enough to cover a large number of possible negative 
and positive impacts on a wide range of stakeholders. In other European countries, the 
scope is narrowed to cost assessment or even narrower, that is, the measurement of 
administrative burdens arising out of proposed regulation.  
This set of criteria led us to reject 18 case studies, leading us to the 31 cases listed in 
table 1. They were scored by the authors according to the codebook described in table 2. 
We decided not to examine cases for which there was a high number of missing values – this 
is especially the case in some Matisse cases. Our sample of case studies contains all the 
cases we could find (minus those with too many missing values, as explained above). It is 
                                                          
1
 The European Commission started with only 21, 27 and 73 RIAs in 2003, 2004 and 2005 respectively, but in recent years it stepped up to 
94 RIAs (2007), 120 (2008) and 75 (source: our calculation from the impact assessment website of the European Commission). In the UK 
183, 277 and 315 RIAs were conducted in 2003, 2004 and 2005 respectively. Since 2007, UK RIAs can be found on the government library 
of impact assessments (http://www.ialibrary.berr.gov.uk/). Earlier RIAs can be found by tracing the Command Papers (spreadsheet with 
full universe of UK RIA can be made available to reviewers upon request). 
2
 We have gathered all the case studies we are aware of in a library that will be soon made publicly available (please note the test site URL 
can be made available to reviewers but this will compromise anonymity). 
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not, however, a sample of RIA: in relation to the total production of RIAs in the UK and the 
EU, 31 is a very small number especially when compared to our aforementioned universe of 
actual impact assessments. But this is precisely the point: we are concerned with a sample 
of case studies, not with a sample of impact assessments. 
 
Table 1 – Sample of case studies 
CASE ID YEAR LEAD DEPT 
(JURISDICTION) 
PROJECT 
BIOMASS ACTION PLAN – Communication on bioenergy 
policy  
1 2005 TREN (EU) EVIA 
WORKING TIME – amendment to a directive regulating 
employee working time 
2 2004 EMPL (EU) EVIA 
BATTERIES – Directive on the disposal of batteries 3 2004 ENV (EU) EVIA 
SUGAR – reducing subsidies to sugar producers to 
liberate markets 
4 2005 AGRI (EU) EVIA 
OPERATING AND FINANCIAL REVIEW OF DIRECTORS – 
policy to extend company reporting requirements 
5 2005 DTI (UK) EVIA 
RAILWAY INTEROPERABILITY – implementation of EU 
policy to promote competition and improve efficiency in 
the rail sector 
6 2006 Dept of Trans 
(UK) 
EVIA 
SOLIDARITY – migration and the integrated 
management of the EU’s boarders 
7 2005 JLS (EU) TEP 
GENDER EQUALITY – recasting of six Directives to 
improve the clarity and transparency in EU gender 
legislation 
8 2004 EMPL (EU) MATISSE 
PRE-PACKED PRODUCTS – Directive on the size of 
packaging of products 
9 2004 ENTR (EU) TEP 
INFSO – Communication on the information society for 
Growth and Employment 
10 2005 INFSO (EU) TEP 
POSTAL SERVICE – proposed Directive on internal postal 
service  
11 2006 MARKT (EU) TEP 
MARITIME TRANSPORT – EC rules at EC level for the 
technical investigation of maritime accidents 
12 2005 TREN (EU) EVIA 
WORKING FAMILY – extension to maternity and 
paternity leave  
13 2005 DTI (UK) EVIA 
DISABILITY – access to public transport for people with 
disabilities 
14 2005 DFT (UK) EVIA 
WORKING TIME TRANSPORT – regulating drivers’ hours 
commercial road transport 
15 2005 DFT (UK) MATISSE 
OFFSHORE – Policy is aimed at reducing oil discharge 
from off-shore drilling platforms 
16 2005 DTI (UK) MATISSE 
CLIMATE CHANGE – assessment of  options for 
addressing climate change in Europe post-2012 
17 2005 ENV (EU) MATISSE 
LEGAL PROTECTION OF DESIGN – regulation of the 
secondary market (repair and replacement) in 
automotive sector 
18 2004 MARKT (EU) MATISSE 
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GROUNDWATER PROTECTION – directive to help better 
protect ground water sources from pollution 
19 2003 ENV (EU) MATISSE 
TIMBER IMPORTS – proposal concerning the 
establishment of a voluntary licensing scheme for 
imports of timber into the European Community 
20 2004 ENV (EU) MATISSE 
AIR POLLUTION – Thematic strategy on air pollution 21 2005 ENV (EU) TEP 
PLANT PROTECTION – Directive regulating products for 
plant protection 
22 2006 SANCO (EU) TEP 
CREDIT UNION INTERESTS – policy to improve access to 
affordable credit by increasing the market share of 
credit unions 
23 2006 HTM (UK) EVIA 
NATIONAL LOTTERY BILL – policy on the allocation of 
lottery funds 
24 2005 DCMS (UK) MATISSE 
PRESCRIPTIONS – regulation of pharmaceutical services 25 2005 DOH (UK) MATISSE 
LAND FILL – policy for Implementation of the EU 
directive on reducing waste to landfill  
26 2004 DEFRA (UK) MATISSE 
KYOTO – policy on linking Kyoto Protocol project credits 
to the European Carbon Emissions Trading Scheme 
27 2005 DEFRA (UK) MATISSE 
HOME OFFICE – policy on the policing of UK boarders 28 2006 HO (UK) MATISSE 
EUROMED – policy towards a liberalized trade in the 
Mediterranean  
29 2005 RELEX (EU) MATISSE 
ENVIRONMENT AND HEALTH – plan for preventive 
action on environmental sources of health impacts 
30 2004 ENV (EU) MATISSE 
EQUIVALENT ACCESS TO LAW – policy to improve level 
of cross-border information exchange to a level 
adequate for law enforcement cooperation 
31 2005 JLS (EU) MATISSE 
TOTAL 31 N/A EU n=19 
UK n=12 
MATISSE 
n=15 
EVIA n=10 
TEP n=6 
 
We acknowledge that our case studies vary in terms of depth, the number of 
interviews conducted, type of documents examined, and more generally the resources 
invested in the preparation of the report. Moreover, research questions vary by project. This 
creates different sources of bias when the findings are aggregated. To reduce this bias, we 
generated an analytical template based on common themes with relevance for political 
analysis addressed by the authors of the original studies alongside our own research 
questions. Table 2 lists the variables. This analytical template was first piloted on four RIAs 
scored independently by each author to check inter-coder reliability, then discussed and 
adjusted, before we proceeded to the full analysis where we each scored a sample of the 31 
case studies. Reliability of the full analysis was then checked through meetings and 
discussion between the authors. The categorization(s) for the RIA usage for each case study 
were agreed by the team after having read the case studies. 
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Table 2 – Codebook: list of variables, indicators, values 
Variable name Indicators 
Values 
Missing value=99 
ID ID number of the case study 1-31 
YEAR Year in which the RIA was carried out YEAR 
LEADDEPARTMENT The department responsible for the RIA DEPARTMENT/DG 
POLSECTOR Substantive policy area POLICY SECTOR 
 
ISSVIS Issue was already visible in the media prior to RIA HIGH = 1 
NOT HIGH = 0 
MISSING = 99 
 
POLNOV New, emerging sector or traditional policy sector NOVEL = 1 
NOT NOVEL = 0 
MISSING = 99 
 
TIMING Evidence about the RIA starting early EARLY (AT START) = 1 
NOT EARLY = 0 
MISSING = 99 
 
ISSCOMPL Complexity-tractability of the problem: can 
policymakers rely on existing measures of the 
problems, models or at least widely-shared heuristics? 
 
COMPLEX = 1 
NOT COMPLEX = 0 
MISSING = 99 
AFFECT Actors affected by the RIA CITIZENS = 1 
INDUSTRY / FIRMS = 2 
PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION = 3 
OTHER = 4 
MISSING = 99 
 
DISTRIB The issue at the core of IA has distributional effects HIGH = 1 
NOT HIGH = 0 
MISSING = 99 
 
BUREAU Bureaucratic actors involved – from different 
departments, senior officers or also junior officers, 
inter-service teams 
 
NAME OF ACTORS 
CENTRALU Role of central oversight unit. Does the central unit 
provide scrutiny and checks on the analysis produced 
by the regulators without assisting them in the 
preparation of RIA [1]? Or does it provide a helping 
hand to the regulator, for example assisting in the 
preparation of impact assessment [2]? Is its role 
irrelevant or totally absent in this case [0]? 
 
QUALITY ASSURANCE = 
1 
PROVIDING HELP = 2 
SMALL / NO ROLE = 0 
MISSING = 99 
OUTEXP Information on use of external expertise and 
consultants in the RIA process  
YES = 1 
NO = 0 
MISSING = 99 
 
ELECTGOV Evidence about the involvement of political actors  YES = 1 
NO = 0 
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MISSING = 99 
 
PARLROLE Evidence about the involvement of the Parliament in 
using the RIA 
YES = 1 
NO = 0 
MISSING = 99 
 
CONSULTWHO Actors consulted INDUSTRY = 1 
UNIONS = 2 
NGOs = 3 
OTHER = 4 
MISSING = 99 
 
CONSULTNUMBER Number of actors consulted 1-N 
INFORMCONS Involvement of social actors on policy formulation 
outside the RIA 
YES = 1 
NO = O 
MISSING = 99 
 
BALANC Overall balance of consultation BALANCED = 1 
SKEWED = 0 
MISSING = 99 
 
TRANSP Transparency, including publication of RIA and 
documents 
HIGH = 1 
NOT HIGH = 0 
MISSING = 99 
 
DIALRESPON RIA shows how the issues raised in consultation were 
addressed by policy officers 
YES = 1 
NO = 0 
MISSING = 99 
 
TRADEOF Analysis of trade-offs YES = 1 
NO = 0 
MISSING = 99 
 
COUNTERRIA Appraisals produced to counter the official RIA or to 
influence it during the appraisal process 
YES = 1 
NO = 0 
MISSING = 99 
 
DE-LEGPROC Evidence of attempt to delegitimize the RIA process YES = 1 
NO = 0 
MISSING = 99 
 
OPTRANGE Number of options considered 1-N 
 
DONOWT Evidence that the do-nothing option and the status 
quo were considered and properly appraised 
YES = 1 
NO = 0 
MISSING = 99 
 
UNCERT Analysis of uncertainty (confidence intervals, 
sensitivity analysis) 
YES = 1 
NO = 0 
MISSING = 99 
 
INTERG-DIFF Consideration of different dimensions and integration 
of different perspectives 
YES = 1 
NO = 0 
MISSING = 99 
 
TIMEDIM Short-term or long-term analysis YES LONG-TERM = 1 
NO, SHORT-TERM = 0 
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MISSING = 99 
 
RESOU Evidence of resource constraints YES SEVERE = 1 
NO = 0 
MISSING = 99 
 
INSTRUMENTAL 
 
Evidence that the RIA process is used to enhance 
substantive understandings of the cause and effects 
mechanisms that underpin the issue 
YES = 1 
NO = 0 
MISSING = 99 
POLUSAGE 
 
Evidence that the RIA is being used to exercise control 
of the bureaucracy and / or is used by affected 
stakeholders to provoke or handle conflict 
YES = 1 
NO = 0 
MISSING = 99 
   
SUMMATIVE 
Summative statement on the type of usages of RIA; 
key quotations from the case studies SENTENCE 
 
 
4. Findings 1 – Identifying RIA Usage through Univariate Analysis 
 
We found perfunctory (7 cases for the UK, 10 for the EU), political (4 UK, 9 EU), instrumental 
(6 UK, 6 EU plus 1 EU case with weak learning effects) and communicative RIAs (0 UK, 5 EU). 
The total exceeds 31 because as expected there are multi-purpose RIAs. The lack of 
communicative RIAs in the UK seems to confirm the trend towards centralized control, in 
line with previous research (Radaelli, 2010a). 
 
Table 3 – Summary of univariate analysis 
 EU UK Totals 
Political usage 9 4 13 
Instrumental usage 7 (including 
weak case) 
6 13 
Communicative usage 5 0 5 
Perfunctory usage 9 7 16 
Totals 30 17 47 
 
a. Political Usages 
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ID 1, 2, 3, 5, 9, 17, 18, 19, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30 
These cases provide evidence of political control, as well as political interest in using the 
findings to inform the strategic behavior of elected policymakers. Political usage also means 
the attempt to shape appraisal by injecting conflict inside and around the process of 
preparing and finalizing the RIA. In classic Schattschneiderian (1960) fashion, actors that are 
to incur losses expand the scope of conflict and seek to frame more politically the function 
and scope of appraisal. We should be clear, the success or otherwise of these political 
activities is not the matter at stake here. Rather, we are simply interested in the political 
usage of RIA rather than the outcome. 
 To illustrate, case ID 18 shows that the appraisal served to magnify the conflicts that 
already existed in the policy sector and, importantly, provided a re-negotiation of the 
regulatory space for the consumer lobby on an issue which had hitherto been dominated by 
the car industry. The proposal for extended company reporting requirements in the form of 
an Operating and Financial Review (OFR; ID 5) was first raised by an independent steering 
group in the context of formal review of company law. OFR was adopted in early 2005. It 
was due to come into force in 2006. But the government announced the decision to revoke 
this measure to showcase its commitment to cut 'unnecessary red tape'. Friends of the 
Earth challenged the decision through a judicial review procedure on the basis of a 'breach 
of legitimate expectation'. This organization argued that only selected business groups were 
consulted on the withdrawal of the OFR. Instead – they argued – the RIA behind the 2005 
OFR had shown that a wider range of stakeholders was affected. In consequence, they 
should have been consulted before announcing the decision to abandon the OFR. 
 Other cases show that the process of appraisal is used to negotiate attention and 
priority for one instrument or another – which is also a way of negotiating political priorities 
around regulatory reform. Pre-packed products in the EU (ID 9) is instead about the tension 
created by ideational ambiguity about the overall direction of regulatory policy. At the 
outset, pre-packed products were supposed to be a showcase of the revamped better 
regulation strategy of the Barroso Commission in 2005, pro-business and de-regulatory. The 
overall nature of this measure induced the lead Directorate General to come up with a short 
RIA – since it was felt that there was very little to justify in a measure leading to freer 
markets. Yet, the whole case became highly problematic when the European Parliament 
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started to politicize the discussion and introduce issues concerning the protection of 
consumers. Meuwese (2008: 253) explains that "for that very reason (its flavor of 
deregulation) this dossier was selected by the rapporteur in the EP to be the first 
parliamentary RIA. (...) The EP accused the Commission of selective consultation and of 
ignoring the social impacts of the proposal on weak consumers. The European Commission 
found the parliamentary RIA utterly un-convincing and went on to propose (and secure) 
liberalization of pack sizes in even more sectors than originally envisaged." 
We also observed more deliberate politicization, in the sense that the appraisal 
process was geared towards the policy options favored by ministers or commissioners (e.g. 
cases ID 24, 25, 28, 29). For instance with the UK lottery case (ID 24) the RIA was conducted 
with the sole purpose of getting ministerial clearance, rather than learning about alternative 
options. In case ID 25 the chosen option was that ‘prescribed by the minister’. With the 
EUROMED case (ID 29) the final decision was politically driven, not evidence driven. 
Overall, nine cases provide evidence of involvement of the central unit beyond 
technical assistance and providing help. Ten cases show involvement of political actors in 
the RIA. Finally, there are four cases of political RIAs that have been openly questioned by 
stakeholders who have produced counter-impact analyses. 
 
b. Instrumental Usages 
ID 1 (weak effects), 3, 4, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 20, 21, 25, 26, 28 
We expected to find a low number of RIAs oriented towards instrumental usage. Among 
different reasons, there are the frequent observations that RIAs start late in the policy 
process and are constrained in terms of time and resources for economic analysis (NAO, 
various years). However, in our sample, twenty-three cases did not report severe 
constraints. This perhaps explains why we have found several RIAs whose uses were 
instrumental.  
Constellations of actors implement RIA requirements to learn how to use economic 
analysis or to structure their relations with other departments at the stage of formulation of 
cross-cutting proposals. RIA is therefore re-framed and negotiated to find out what is the 
legitimate room and autonomy of department A in relation to departments B, C and the 
central oversight unit. At the level of the Commission, there is considerable appreciation for 
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RIA as a tool that has made the dialogue between one lead Directorate General (DG) and 
the others relatively smooth and evidence-based. Case ID 1 is mostly perfunctory, but there 
is modest instrumental usage in that the DG in charge learned how to calibrate the choice of 
regulatory instrument and to perform multi-disciplinary analysis. Another of the 
Commission's RIAs (case ID 3) portrays some limited instrumental usage, in that interservice 
consultation led to amendments to the assessment.  
Classic instances of instrumental use via economic analysis are case ID 26 (where 
appraisal was done "as part of the policy development process to shift through ideas and 
work through options") and ID 13 (RIA had an important role in informing the detailed policy 
design and influence significant decisions). One explanation is that the RIA process started 
early enough to allow time for analysis. Another is that all the Commission's RIA we 
examined belong to an early phase of development of EU impact assessment: several 
officers at the Commission wanted to showcase their initial work on RIA as best-practice and 
to dampen suspicions about their capacity for evidence-based appraisal.  
The use of external experts is systematic, both in the UK and the Commission: in 
total, we found seventeen cases in which experts contributed to appraisal, presumably 
improving on the knowledge base available to the officers. Sometimes the experts become 
quite internal to the process and can be effectively considered part of the team working out 
the RIA within the bureaucracy.  
 
c. Communicative Usages 
ID 2, 11, 18, 20, 21 
 Having read the case studies and discussed them in our team, we concluded that five 
RIAs were communicative in the broader sense that we define earlier. In case ID 2, the 
actors placed the negotiation of priorities and transparency above everything else. Case ID 
21 portrays a communicative process in terms of balancing arguments and analysis. In ID 18, 
the consultation process was conflictual however on the one hand it made the lines of 
conflict clearer and therefore more manageable. On the other, it allowed consumer 
associations to actually take part in appraisal processes whilst at the beginning the only 
actor involved was industry. The other cases show a wide-ranging of communication beyond 
formal consultation from public events to demonstration workshops, and events targeting 
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specially targeted audiences. Thus, consultation is not a single event, but a mode of 
performing regulatory appraisal. 
 
d. Perfunctory Usages 
ID 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 10, 15, 16, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31 
There are several cases that strongly suggest a perfunctory engagement with RIA. Cases ID 
16 23, 26 and 30 imply that RIA was a box ticking exercise to comply with formal 
requirements. The RIA in case ID 2 was perfunctory; ‘most significant elements of it would 
have been addressed … in the absence of a formal IA. The main purpose of the IA was to 
build acceptance within the social partners' (Evia, 2007: 61). The analysis of cases ID 23 and 
ID 31 were more explicit in suggesting that the IA was part of a rubber stamping exercise 
where this process was used to add a veneer of evidence and data to a policy deal which 
had already been done.  
It would be wrong to assume that the perfunctory aspects of RIA are always 
deliberate choices to dress up pre-fabricated positions. In some cases, there is genuine 
difficulty of handling the kind of rational process described in the guidelines when it is clear 
to all those who are involved that the end of the story has already been written – for 
example at the nation state level when the RIA is about the implementation of a directive of 
the EU. 
Other cases highlight the difficult synchronization between the timing of impact 
assessment and the actual formulation of policy proposals. Although developed at the same 
time, the proposal in ID 7 was not the result of deliberations based on RIA. Instead, and 
contrary to the logic of appraisal, the two documents were fine-tuned and harmonized to 
make sure they would not contradict each other. Yet another group of cases show that the 
involvement of experts can become part of the perfunctory element of RIA when they come 
from narrow ranges of expertise and do not engage with analysis, but rather with 
imaginative ideas about the presentation of the proposed rule. 
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5. Findings 2 – Exploring the Interplay of Variables Using Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA) 
 
To go beyond univariate analysis and explore the interplay between contexts and policy 
actors, we explored the conditions for different usages by examining our data with 
dedicated Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs/QCA) software
3
. The two core analytical 
intuitions in this approach are configurational analysis and equifinality (Ragin, 1987). 
Configurational analysis points to the joint effect of conditions. Thus, crisp set QCA draws on 
the Boolean algebra's logical operations (AND / OR) to identify combination of conditions, 
rather than viewing cross-case patterns through the classic lenses of the “net” effect of 
independent variables on dependent variables. Equifinality means that there may be 
multiple configurational paths – recipes – leading to the same outcome. Of course, this does 
not mean that there are an infinite number of recipes. Indeed, with QCA, researchers use 
their theoretical expectations to explore a finite number of paths (Ragin, 1987, 2008). 
Conditions can be necessary and/or (jointly) sufficient for the outcome. A necessary 
condition is a condition that must be present in order to observe the outcome, while a 
sufficient condition is a condition that, if observed, guarantees the presence of the 
outcome. The analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions is based on set-theoretic 
relations, meaning that they are assessed by comparing the membership scores of each case 
in the conditions, and, respectively, in the outcome. Fuzzy-set QCAs allow for degrees of set 
membership in the interval between 0 and 1. Our data can be coded as 0 (absence) and 1 
(presence) hence we use crisp-set QCA (csQCA) (Rihoux and Ragin, 2008). 
 The goal of our application of QCA is not to test one single hypothetical-deductive 
model, but it is more tentative and heuristic: to explore whether the usages of RIA are 
related with different, coherent configurations of variables, and to discover ‘unexpected’ 
recipes (for a similar approach see Jackson, 2005). Thus, by using QCA our aim is not to 
explain the impact of any single independent variable, but rather to illustrate the complex 
configurational paths leading to the different outcomes (Grofman and Schneider, 2009). As 
mentioned, one important function of QCA is to establish conditions that jointly lead to a 
                                                          
3
 Provided by Charles Ragin at http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml 
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given outcome. This is important because the prescriptions of international organizations 
tend to stress the same combinations. QCA can test these normative propositions as well as 
finding out cases of equifinality, e.g., different combinations of variables that are leading to 
outcome ‘instrumental usage’. Thus, we use QCA to widen our peripheral vision to explore 
combinations that have not been considered yet. 
We present the analysis of sufficient conditions, using the standard procedure for 
crisp-set “truth tables” implemented in the fs/QCA software
4
. In line with our research 
goals, and given the presence of missing data on some conditions (see the appendix), our 
interpretation of “sufficiency” is restricted to the exploration of different configurational 
paths leading to each outcome, without any strong claim of causality, and with limited 
generalizability
5
. Furthermore, to deal with these missing values, consistency and coverage 
scores have been recomputed, recipe-by-recipe, by using the results of prior truth table 
analyses
6
. This procedure allowed us to check the robustness of our analyses by maximizing 
the number of cases included in each recipe at a time. The recomputed scores are 
presented in parentheses in QCA result tables; when a more parsimonious recipe was 
found, it is also reported in parentheses; if the re-analysis produced more complex, 
contradictory results, the recomputed recipes and scores are not reported as it is 
considered inconclusive (i)
7
. 
To explore the combinations of conditions, we used 0-1 variables in table 2 and 
dichotomized some of them
8
. To begin with, we had to determine the role of the Better 
Regulation Executive and the Secretariat General of the Commission – the regulatory 
oversight units. We took 'centralu' from the list in table 1, with a value of 0 for no active role 
of the oversight unit, 1 elsewhere. To explore conditions for an active role of the central 
unit, we followed our expectations and examined the presence or absence of the following: 
(i) the analysis of trade-offs, an indicator of genuine complexity of the assessment; (ii) the 
role of elected officers; (iii) distributive effects; (iv) the 'affect' variable [1 when industry 
                                                          
4
 It is worth noting that relatively few contradictory configurations are present in the truth tables (2 in models 1 and 5; 3 in model 2; 1 in 
model 3 and 0 in models 4 and 67). Following Ragin (1987), these contradictory configurations are treated as ‘unclear’ and recoded as [0] 
on the outcome value. 
5
 For the same reason, we considered the analysis of necessary conditions to be unproductive. 
6
 For example, the recalculation of the first recipe of table 4 implied to recompute consistency and coverage scores by evaluating them 
only with respect to ~tradeof and ~distrib, in addition to standard crisp-set analyses. 
7
 The full analysis is available upon request. 
8
 All cases were analyzed in each model, when possible. As usual, cases with missing values for one or more variables were not included in 
the configurations in the truth table (see the appendix for the details). 
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and/or citizens are affected, 0 when other departments are the main entities affected]; (v) 
the novelty of the issue and (vi) its complexity (all variables are defined in table 2). In the 
following QCA tables, when the sign ~ precedes a variable, it means that that condition is 
“absent”: so for example ~tradeoff means 'absence of trade-offs'.  
The crisp-set intermediate solution for sufficient conditions of the outcome 'active 
role of the central unit' has a quite good solution coverage (0.86; see table 4)
9
. There are 
two paths. The most important path defies our prior expectation. It revolves around a 
combination of lack of distributive effects and lack of trade-offs. A plausible explanation is 
that the oversight unit in this path prefers to avoid meddling with RIA when there are 
distributive effects and trade-offs, perhaps with the intention of staying out of conflicts with 
the stakeholders. This is reflected in the case studies with ‘low politics’ characteristics, 
where conflict was low and stakeholder cooperation and consensus was high. And so, the 
absence of conflict may have contributed to the availability of space for the central actor to 
assume a key role. 
The second path to 'active role of the central unit' is characterized by explicit trade-
offs in the process of appraisal, some degrees of political attention, distributive effects, the 
role of firms affected by the proposed regulation, and complexity of the issue. After having 
recomputed the consistency and coverage scores by maximizing the number of cases 
included in the analysis, both results appear unaffected by missing values. The second 
recipe displays however very poor coverage so that it seems highly contingent on specific 
cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9
 A few definitions are in order here, raw coverage concerns the share of the outcome that is explained by a certain alternative path. 
(Standards of Good Practice in Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Fuzzy-Sets by Schneider and Wagemann, 2010). Consistency is 
the degree to which a subset relation has been approximated (Ragin, 2006). We also need to explain the meaning of solution coverage.  
The solution coverage is the share of the outcome that is explained by the solution. That is, its empirical relevance. The decision on a 
threshold of "decency" depends on the researcher. For some research questions, coverage can be of secondary importance, for other 
research questions, especially if you want to portray some general patterns, it is more important. We assume that over 60% is not too bad 
(in the text we refer to ‘decent’ solution coverage’), over 80% is certainly good. A solution with poor coverage is not false, it is simply rare 
(but maybe it is still interesting). 
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Table 4: Paths to intervention of the regulatory oversight body (SecGen for the 
Commission and Better Regulation Executive for the UK) 
 
Raw 
Coverage 
Consistency 
~tradeof*~distrib  
                         
0.71 
(0.66) 
0.91 
(0.91) 
tradeof*electgov*distrib*affect*isscompl    0.14 
(0.14) 
1 
(1) 
   
Solution coverage: 0.86    
Solution consistency: 0.92   
 
Intermediate solution 
Recomputed recipes and scores are in parentheses (if any) 
(i) = Inconclusive 
Model: centralu = f(tradeof, electgov, distrib, affect, polnov, isscompl)   
 
Another way of looking directly at political usages contemplates elected policymakers 
learning how to manage policy formulation, how to utilize the RIA for political decision-
making, and how to make the agencies and departments responsive to their principals. 
We therefore examined a model with the following variables on the right-hand side: 
role of stakeholders in the process beyond consultation, distributive effects, types of actors 
that were consulted, type of actors that were affected and timing of the appraisal process. 
We had a prior expectation that political usage is higher when stakeholders are active 
outside the perimeter of consultation, for example with media campaigns or direct lobbying. 
Principal-agent theory, in fact, provides the expectation that pressure groups affected by 
proposed regulation ring the fire alarm and alert the principal. The solution coverage is 
decent but lower than in other cases (0.62). The highest raw coverage is provided by the 
combination of involvement of industry in consultation, but also industry being majorly 
affected by regulatory proposals, and sufficient time to sound the alarm (third row in table 
5). For example, in the case of the UK RIA on extending company reporting requirements 
(case id 5) it was an NGO appeal against Government’s plans to relax reporting procedures 
that triggered early industry intervention and politicized the appraisal process. Similarly, the 
RIA concerning the organization of working time at the EU level suggests that politicized and 
‘heavy negotiations’ (Evia, 2007: 58) was largely the result of the dominance of social 
partners in the appraisal. The first two rows of table 5 show the important role played by 
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the involvement of actors outside formal consultation, even if the RIA did not start early. 
This finding can be regarded as robust because the condition “informcons” is stably present 
in the recipes after having recomputed consistency and coverage by considering one recipe 
at a time.  
 
Table 5: Paths to political usages 
 
Raw 
Coverage 
Consistency 
informcons*~affect 
(informcons) 
 
0.13 
(0.67) 
1 
(0.86) 
informcons*~consultwho        
(informcons) 
 
0.13 
(0.67) 
1 
(0.86) 
consultwho*affect*timing                
 
0.50 
(i) 
1 
(i) 
   
Solution coverage: 0.63   
Solution consistency: 1.00   
 
Intermediate solution 
Recomputed recipes and scores are in parentheses (if any) 
(i) = Inconclusive 
Model: polusage = f(informcons, distrib, consultwho, affect, timing)   
 
Political usages can also be examined in a different framework that blurs our initial 
distinction between political control and communicative RIAs (table 6). One can reason that 
RIA can be used to initiate communicative responses that are politically profitable. To check 
this argument, which runs counter to what we said earlier about RIA types, we considered 
the model in table 6. The intermediate solution provides satisfactory solution coverage 
(0.71) and is supported by the robustness check for missing values. It does provide some 
leverage for the counter-argument we are considering, since communicative aspects of RIA 
and the nature of stakeholders affected by the proposals are present in both sufficient 
conditions – one time with high issue visibility and another with skewed consultation. 
‘Skewed consultation’ suggests that political control is associated with RIA as fire alarm for 
the constituencies that matter to the principal – hence RIA is politically useful exactly 
because it stacks the deck favoring some stakeholders over others. 
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Table 6: A communicative view of political usages? 
 
Raw 
Coverage 
Consistency 
dialrespon*~balanc*affect         
      
0.43 
(0.38) 
1 
(1) 
dialrespon*issvis*affect       
 
0.29 
(0.29) 
1 
(1) 
   
Solution coverage: 0.71   
Solution consistency: 1.00   
 
Intermediate solution 
Recomputed recipes and scores are in parentheses (if any) 
(i) = Inconclusive 
Model: polusage = f(dialrespon, balanc, polnov, issvis, affect)  
 
Let us turn to instrumental usages. Various combinations of variables lead to this 
outcome. We expected political use, active intervention of the central unit and the presence 
of elected policymakers in the process of appraisal to hinder evidence-based usage. This 
prior expectation, however, may not be necessarily correct: the central unit can help 
departments and promote instrumental usage. Political attention may increase the 
motivation and rewards associated with engagement with evidence-based usage. Elected 
policymakers may also be beneficial to the process of appraisal, since they can direct the 
economic analysis towards conclusions that are easier to utilize in decision-making 
processes.  
We explored this somewhat ambiguous prior expectation with the model in table 7. 
The model has high solution coverage (1) and shows a combination of two conditions that 
are particularly relevant. One is an early start of the appraisal process (variable 'timing') and 
the use of consultants from outside public administration (variable 'outexp'). The 
importance of embedding external expertise before the RIA process begins was particularly 
evident in the EU appraisal of proposals to restructure the sugar sector (case id 4). The 
potential abolition of intervention mechanisms in the EU sugar market regime meant the 
threat of judicial review from disgruntled stakeholders was very real and resulted in the 
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adoption of an evidence-based approach to policy change. As a result, the appraisal process 
was described by analysts as one underpinned by ‘mutual learning’ (Evia, 2007: 50). 
Equally high row coverage is found for another, more complicated sufficient 
combination of conditions. This alternative path postulates an active role of the oversight 
unit, presumably concerned with the quality of RIA and the presence of elected 
policymakers in the process combined with the absence of trade-offs.
10
 This second path 
seems however highly contingent on missing cases, because when recomputed it led to 
inconclusive results. 
 
Table 7: Instrumental usage 
 
Raw 
Coverage 
Consistency 
outexp*timing 
 
0.43 
(0.33) 
1 
(1) 
outexp*~polusage*centralu 
(outexp*centralu) 
 
0.29 
(0.40) 
1 
(1) 
~timing*centralu*electgov 
 
0.29 
(i) 
1 
(i) 
~tradeof*centralu*electgov 
 
0.43 
(i) 
1 
(i) 
~outexp*~polusage*~centralu*~electgov 
 
0.14 
(i) 
1 
(i) 
   
Solution coverage: 1.00   
Solution consistency: 1.00   
 
Intermediate solution 
Recomputed recipes and scores are in parentheses (if any) 
(i) = Inconclusive 
Model: instrumental = f(tradeof, outexp, timing, polusage, centralu, electgov)   
 
Turning to our third type, the communicative RIAs (table 8), one variable in our template 
highlights an important dimension ('Dialrespon', coded at 1 when the case study included 
evidence of communicative responses to the stakeholders, typically by showing how the 
                                                          
10
 Note that a value of 0 for this variable simply means that there are no trade-offs in the published RIA, we do not know whether the 
trade-offs were ignored or simply did not exist, although if ignored and important they should have shown up in other variables, such as 
'low legitimacy’ of the RIA. 
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concerns raised in consultation processes were taken into consideration). We looked for 
some obvious variables that could possibly affect the outcome, such as the novelty of the 
policy issue (variable 'polnov'), whether industry or other actors were affected (variable 
'affect)', the visibility of the policy problem (variable 'issvis'), the timing of RIA in the policy 
formulation cycle (variable 'timing'), the presence of uses of the RIA by elected officers 
(variable 'electgov'), and whether resources were severely constrained or not (variable 
'resou'). 
The examination of crisp sets reveals the role played by the variables in different 
configurations. The intermediate solution coverage is not particularly high (0.75) but there 
are only two important paths. In both cases the communicative outcome is associated with 
the presence of industry-level stakeholders being affected by the proposed regulation, in 
combination with other variables. In one path, 'affect' is combined with elected politicians 
kept at bay from the RIA, in a context when resources (human and financial) are not 
constrained and issue visibility is low, more communicative usage is found. The appraisal 
process associated with the investigation of accidents in the maritime sector (case id 12) is 
illustrative. Here communication as fostered by member states involved being limited to 
sharing best practice in maritime passenger transport and insights form accident case 
histories (Evia, 2007: 36-38).  
 
Table 8: Communicative responses to consultation 
 
Raw 
Coverage 
Consistency 
~affect*~electgov*~resou*~issvis  0.13 
(i) 
1 
(i) 
affect*~electgov*resou*~issvis    
   
0.38 
(i) 
1 
(i) 
affect*~issvis*timing*~resou           
 
0.25 
(i) 
1 
(i) 
   
Solution coverage: 0.75   
Solution consistency: 1.00   
 
Intermediate solution 
Recomputed recipes and scores are in parentheses (if any) 
(i) = Inconclusive 
Model: dialrespon = f(polnov, affect, issvis, timing, electgov, resou)   
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To carry on with the exploration of communicative RIAs, we consider a model for the 
variable 'transparency'. The model includes different variables, specifically information 
about stakeholders’ involvement beyond consultation (variable 'informcons'), the elected 
policymakers, resources constraints (value of 1 for severely constrained resources), the 
central oversight unit, balanced consultation, who is affected, and timing of the RIA.  
We had a prior expectation that transparency is higher when economic stakeholders 
are involved, consultation is balanced, and time and other resources are not severely 
constrained. The presence of elected politicians can push the agencies to be more 
transparent. In the appraisal process of the EU’s thematic strategy on air pollution (case id 
21), Commission officials involved in drafting the impact assessment were mindful that the 
proposals had to stand up to the wider scrutiny of the Commission Cabinet, European 
Parliament and Council (TEP, 2007: 306-307). The oversight unit similarly combines with 
affect and balanced consultation to create a path to appraisal transparency. As table 9 
illustrates, a balanced consultation is important in three combinations of conditions. 
Overall, the intermediate solution for crisp sets has a very high coverage and solutions are 
mainly stable after having dealt with missing values. 
 
Table 9: Combinations leading to transparency 
 
Raw 
Coverage 
Consistency 
resou*affect 
 
0.33 
(0.32) 
1 
(1) 
electgov*balanc*affect         
                
0.33 
(0.40) 
1 
(1) 
centralu*balanc*affect       
(centralu*affect) 
             
0.44 
(0.62) 
1 
(1) 
informcons*electgov*centralu*affect    
 
   
0.22 
(i) 
1 
(i) 
 
informcons*balanc*affect*timing  
 
0.22 
(i) 
1 
(i) 
   
Solution coverage: 1.00   
Solution consistency: 1.00   
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Intermediate solution 
Recomputed recipes and scores are in parentheses (if any) 
(i) = Inconclusive 
Model: transp = f(informcons, electgov, resou, centralu, balanc, affect, timing)    
 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
This article contributes to the literature on policy instruments and knowledge utilization by 
relaxing the assumption that instruments unambiguously embody theories, beliefs and 
ideas. This may be true at the abstract level – there is no doubt that RIA incarnates beliefs 
about the role of economic analysis and cost-benefit principles (Kysar, 2010; Turnpenny et 
al, 2009). However, when the guidelines written by governments are implemented by 
constellations of actors, the 'ideas behind the instrument' look more ambiguous and pliable 
– a point that chimes with Jabko's notion of ideas as ‘talismans’ (Jabko, 2006). They can be 
negotiated on the ground. The whole RIA can be reframed in one direction or another. The 
initial commitment of the government to carry out the RIA is an incomplete contract that 
can be shaped by implementation actors. 
Since appraisal is re-framed by communities of practice, it often leads to outcomes 
that may be very different from the original aims set by the government. Ours is another 
way of looking at the expectations-capability and adoption-implementation gaps that 
emerge in recent studies of RIA (Jakob et al, 2008). Our results, however, come with several 
limitations. We scored cases that were influenced by the early period of the Commission's 
RIA strategy. And we did not explore wider comparisons, by adding other European 
countries and, perhaps, the US-Canadian cases – something that future research could 
usefully do. 
 Empirically, we confirm that there are at least four types of manipulation of RIAs – 
this is our answer to the first research question. Contrary to our prior expectations, the 
sample shows that instrumental usage is not so rare. Additionally, given certain conditions, 
communicative and political usages of RIA are closer than we thought. The combinations we 
examined by using crisp-set QCA to answer our second research question show that the 
prior expectations are not necessarily wrong. But they focus on one variable at a time. An 
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example is consultation, often seen as panacea for learning and dialogue with the 
stakeholders. Another is the role of elected politicians, often seen as 'political meddling with 
the RIA' whilst it can also lead to transparency. Overall, QCA points towards more complex 
combinations of conditions. 
Methodologically, we have demonstrated the advantage of using meta-analysis and 
QCA to explore case studies in a cumulative fashion, thus providing a more comprehensive 
and systematic coverage than previous case-study research. By examining the rich data 
generated from cumulative case studies, our findings also complement the scorecard-based 
studies of compilations of RIAs. 
Finally, our third research question, what are the implications of this analysis? We 
found that constellations of actors reframe the appraisal process by using regulatory 
innovations in different ways. They negotiate 'what's the impact assessment to do' when 
they 'sit down' and attend to a specific RIA. In some cases this is a good thing – the local 
actors define what RIA should do for them, given the balance of power, resources, and 
problems at hand. Arguably, actors have to invent an ‘art of convening’ (Rein, 2006: 397) by 
pre-negotiations in which shared agreements about the purpose of the RIA in that case can 
be developed. In other cases, shaping meanings may lead to an explosion of expectations 
about what the RIA is for. This variability of RIA usages could be reduced if governments 
were clearer on expectations. In terms of policy recommendations, the QCA analysis shows 
that there are different paths to desirable outcomes. Governments, international 
organizations and audit bodies should therefore explore different combinations of 
conditions leading to the usages they deem desirable rather than arguing for a fixed menu 
of variables. 
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